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Hopkins: Epilogue

EPILOGUE
In FredAhlert Music Corp. v. Warner/ChappellMusic, Inc., 155
F.3d 17 (2d Circ. 1998), the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York entered judgment in favor of Fred
Ahlert Music Corp., ("Ahlert") holding that Wamer/Chappell
Music, Inc. ("Warner") was not entitled to a derivative works
exception under the 1976 Copyright Act's termination provision.
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's holding that
Warner's use did not fall within the exception. The court further
explained that a copyright holder, and not the publisher, has the
authority to license new uses of a song for the duration of the
extended renewal term.
The history of this case dates back to May 3, 1926, when a
copyright was granted to the authors of "Bye, Bye, Blackbird."
This copyright was later renewed and each author assigned his
interest to Remick Music Corporation ("Remick"), Warner's
predecessor in interest. The derivative work in question was
created in 1969 when Warner granted a mechanical license to A &
M records authorizing the recording and manufacturing of a
version of the song performed by Joe Cocker.
This action arose when Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. ("Tri-Star") sought
permission from Ahlert to use the Cocker recording on the motion
picture soundtrack for the movie "Sleepless in Seattle." Ahlert
issued a synchronization and performance license to Tri-Star for
the domestic use of the song. The license specified background
vocal and instrumental uses of the song on the soundtrack.
Warner, the owner of the work's foreign rights, issued similar
licenses for the foreign use. Ahlert also issued a mechanical
license to Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. ("Sony"), Tri-Star's
affiliate, for the manufacture and sale of the song on the soundtrack
through its agent, the Harry Fox Agency ("Fox"). Fox also
represents Warner, who claimed to retain all rights associated with
the Cocker derivative. As such, Fox canceled the Ahlert license to
Sony and issued a new one on Warner's behalf. Ahlert brought suit
to recover the mechanical royalties paid to Warner and obtain a
judgment that Warner may not justify licensing new uses of the
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song by relying on the derivative works exception to the revised
Copyright Act's termination provision.
The issue before the court was whether the publisher, or the
author and his heirs, has the right to license new uses of a pretermination derivative work after its termination. To answer this
question, the court examined the derivative works exception.
Although the Cocker recording as manufactured by A & M is a
valid derivative work, its inclusion on the soundtrack may not fall
within the terms of the grant. The court looked to the Supreme
Court's decision in Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, in which "the terms
of the grant" were interpreted as including the rights and
limitations defined in each pre-termination agreement. This group
of rights must continue to be enforced.
The court then examined the pre-termination agreements
governing the dispute to discern whether Wamer's use would be
authorized by the terms of the grant. The controlling agreements
pointed toward a narrowly defined right on Wamer's behalf. The
A & M license specifically authorized the creation and
manufacturing of the Cocker derivative but it did not authorize
additional releases of the song. The court explained that while
publishers are entitled to continued benefits from derivative works
pursuant to pre-termination grants, they are also bound to the
limited exploitation defined in such agreements.
Therefore,
Wamer's benefit is limited to the royalties received from the sale
of the A & M phono-record.
The court also invoked the legislative motivation for both the
extended renewal term and the derivative works exception to
justify the result that authors remain in control of licensing new
post-termination uses of derivative works. Leaving the power to
license in the hands of Ahlert not only satisfied the policy behind
the derivative works exception but also comported with the general
thrust of the 1976 renewal term by maximizing the author's ability
to take advantage of the extended right.
The Second Circuit affirmed the decision in favor of Ahlert
when it held that Wamer's derivative use of the recording on the
soundtrack did not fall within the derivative works exception of the
termination provision as it was not covered in the terms of the
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol9/iss1/11
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original grant. Furthermore, it is the copyright holder, not the
publisher, who has the authority to license post-termination uses of
the derivative work for the duration of the extended terms.

Kristen Hopkins
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Elvis PresleyEnterprisesInc. v. Capece,
141 F.3d 188 (51t Cir. 1998).
This new decision by the Fifth Circuit addresses use of a
trademark in a parody context. Plaintiff, Elvis Presley Enterprises
Inc. ("EPE"), is the owner of all trademarks, copyrights, and
publicity rights belonging to the Elvis Presley estate. The
defendant, Barry Capece, operated a nightclub in Houston, Texas
called "The Velvet Elvis." The bar's decor included a velvet
painting of Elvis, numerous magazine photographs of Elvis, and a
statuette of Elvis playing the guitar. The bar served a wide variety
of food and liquor. The menu items, which ranged from appetizers
to full entrees also made references to the Elvis theme. The menu
included items such as: "Love Me Blenders," a type of frozen
drink; "peanut butter and banana sandwiches," a favorite of Elvis';
and "Your Football Hound Dog," a hotdog sandwich.
EPE filed suit against Capece in the Southern District of Texas
alleging claims for unfair competition, trademark infingement,
and federal trademark dilution. The trial court ruled in favor of
EPE on its claims of trademark infiingement and unfair
competition relating to the Defendant's advertising practices, but
not those claims relating to their use of "The Velvet Elvis" service
mark. EPE appealed the ruling.
In this case, the district court found that "The Velvet Elvis"
mark, when combined with the bar's gaudy decor was an integral
part of the Defendant's parody of the faddish, eclectic bars of the
sixties. Additionally, the district court stated that "The Velvet
Elvis" mark is symbolic of a faddish art style and the mark has no
specific connection with Elvis other than the coincidence of its use
to portray him.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the ruling. The Fifth Circuit explained
that a trademark parody exists only when the challenged use pokes
fun at the plaintiffs trademark. In this case, the defendants
claimed that their use pokes fun at society in general, and in
particular, the 1960's club scene. Since this parody was not
directed at the plaintiffs "Elvis" trademark, the defendant's use
was not a trademark parody. The parody was irrelevant to the
likelihood of the confusion analysis and thus, the fact the
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defendants used the name "Elvis" as part of a parody to society in
the 1960's was a moot point.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ZONING REGULATIONS

Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Town of Penfield, New York, Penfield,
Zoning Board ofAppeals, and HaroldMorehouse,
934 F.Supp. 540 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
Payless ShoeSource, Inc. ("Payless") brought an action against
the town of Penfield, New York alleging that a town sign
ordinance unlawfully interfered with its registered trademark and,
therefore, violated the Lanham Act. Payless, who operates retail
stores in Penfield, has a registered trademark. The mark consists
of the name "Payless ShoeSource" displayed in yellow, except for
the two "o"s which are displayed in orange. Penfield demanded
Payless change its sign to a single, board-approved color or seek a
variance. Payless applied for a variance, but Penfield denied its
application.
Penfield's regulations precluded operators of retail stores from
erecting and maintaining signs with two colors. Payless contended
this restriction was in direct violation of the Lanham Act
prohibiting a state from requiring an alteration of a federally
registered trademark. More specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b)
provides that no state or any political subdivision may require the
alteration of a registered trademark. Penfield argued that aesthetic
zoning does not constitute an alteration of a registered trademark,
but instead was a permissible use of the town's police powers.
The court found its decision by looking to the legislative
intent of the statute in order to decide whether an aesthetic zoning
regulation will constitute an alteration of a registered trademark
within the meaning of the statute. The court resolved the issue by
stating that the legislative history was not designed to inhibit a
municipality's ability to control the appearances of commercial
developments within its borders.
The court continued by
explaining that Payless was still able to use its mark in its
windows, on its bags, boxes, stationery and indoor displays
unchanged by the zoning ordinance. Penfield's regulations did not
address trademarks at all. The regulations merely restricted the
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nature and type of outdoor adversiting permitted in two large
shopping plazas within Penfield. The court concluded by noting
the intent of 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b) was not to interfere with uniform,
aesthetic zoning requirements that may indirectly affect a
trademark, but was aimed only at prohibiting the actual alteration
of a trademark.
Blockbuster Videos, Inc. v. Tempe, 141 F.3d 1295 (9'"Cir. 1998)
Blockbuster Videos, Inc. ("Blockbuster") is a national retail
chain which rents and sells videos and other related entertainment.
Blockbuster owns two registered service marks. One service mark
consists of a a logo depicting a torn ticket with a blue background
and yellow lettering. The second service mark consists of a logo
depicting a blue awning with the words "Blockbuster Video" in
yellow block letters. In Tempe, Arizona, all exterior signs in the
shopping center must conform to the shopping center's sign
package which specifies the color, size and location of signs. The
sign package for the shopping center in which Blockbuster had
leased space required blue, red or yellow letters. Blockbuster
applied for a variance to use its service marks. The service mark
with the torn ticket logo was approved while the service mark with
the blue awning was not approved.
Blockbuster sued the city of Tempe alleging the zoning law
violates the Lanham Act which specifically prohibits states and
other government municipalities from mandating the alteration of a
federally registered trademark. The city rebutted the allegation,
contending that it should be able to require alteration in exercise of
its police power to ensure compliance with aesthetic zoning laws.
This case was an issue of first impression for the Ninth Circuit.
A divided panel held that the city of Tempe could not enforce a
zoning regulation that requires the alteration of a federally
registered trademark. The court based its decision on the plain
language of 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b) which prohibits alteration. The
court explained that if the city had precluded the display of the
registered mark altogether, this action would have been permissible
pursuant to the statute's plain language. In order to be a symbol
that customers will recognize, it must have uniform appearance,
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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not only in design but also in color. Precluding display of a mark
for zoning purposes is permissible, but requiring alteration of a
mark is not permissible.
Lisa 'sParty City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta,
2 F.Supp.2d 378 (W.D.N.Y. 1998)
Plaintiff, Lisa's Party City, Inc. ("Party City"), brought an action
against the town of Henrietta (the "Town") alleging a violation of
the Lanham Act when the Town denied Party City's application to
install a sign on the exterior of the store which read "Party City" in
large multi-colored letters and "The Discount Party Store" in small
red letters. Party City was denied permission to display the multicolored sign, a federally registered trademark, pursuant to the
Town's zoning ordinance which required storefront signs in
shopping plazas to be uniform in appearance and color. The
Town's code specified that each individual store would be
permitted to have one wall or roof sign, the design of which would
be coordinated so as to create aesthetic uniformity with the
shopping plaza.
Since the owner of the plaza where Party City was located
selected the color red for all the plaza's signs, Party City applied
for a variance to erect its multi-colored sign. After its application
was denied, Party City asserted that requiring the sign bearing its
multi-colored mark to be one color (red) effectively alters their
trademark.
The court reviewed the legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 1121(b)
and stated that the statute's intent was not to interfere with uniform
aesthetic zoning requirements that may indirectly affect a
trademark. The statute was aimed only at prohibiting the actual
alteration of the mark. The Town was not preempted by the
federal statute from enacting and enforcing a zoning regulation
which restricts the use of color in exterior signs in local shopping
plazas, even though a uniform color is incompatible with Party
City's multi-colored mark.
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